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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

appropriate and such appropriation would not deprive prior rights
holders of that water. Thus, the Legislature did not create a "super
status water use" for utilization of floodwaters.
The court concluded that summary judgment was proper as a
matter of law because section 72-5-29 concerns flood waters and
Waterfall was not asserting a right to flood waters, but to water from
Culberson Spring.
Furthermore, Waterfall was not entitled to
appropriation under section 72-5-29 because this statute does not
provide Waterfall a superseding natural right to water from a fully
appropriated stream system. The only basis for Waterfall's argument
responding to the unavailability of unappropriated waters was from Mr.
Murrill's opinion, based on personal knowledge, that individual liquid
waste disposal systems would return the water Waterfall sought to
appropriate back to vested rights holders. The court dismissed Mr.
Murill's testimony because it was opinion testimony unsupported by
scientific fact and thus insufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's ruling.
Karna Swenson Phipps
UTAH
Otter Creek Reservoir Co. v. New Escalante Irrigation Co., 203 P.3d
1015 (Utah 2009) (holding that a water user must complete seven years
of adverse use by the 1939 effective date of an amendment to the water
right statute to obtain a water right by adverse possession).
Otter Creek Reservoir Company ("Otter Creek") and New Escalante
Irrigation Company ("New Escalante") claimed rights to snow melt near
the divide between the Sevier River drainage and the Escalante River
drainage. Without a diversion, the water would flow into the Sevier
River, which forms part of Otter Creek's water supply. New Escalante
claimed that it adversely used the water since December 1, 1936 by way
of a ditch that intercepted the water and carried it to the Escalante
River drainage. The issue concerned the application of a 1939
amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-1 which prohibited the
acquisition of water rights by adverse use. Prior to 1939, water users
could obtain a right through seven years of "continuous, uninterrupted,
hostile, notorious, adverse use." Otter Creek filed an action with the
Sixth District Court in Utah against New Escalante in 2001 seeking a
declaratory judgment that New Escalante had no right to use the water.
New Escalante filed a counterclaim, arguing that it had a diligence
right, or, in the alternative, a superior right based on adverse use.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Otter
Creek with respect to the diligence claim, holding that New Escalante
forfeited its right by not participating in the 1936 adjudication of all
water rights in the Sevier River drainage ("Cox Decree"). The district
court denied summary judgment regarding the adverse use claim,
holding that because New Escalante's adverse use began prior to the
effective date of the amended statute in 1936, the use could still ripen
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into a water right. Following the district court's decision, Otter Creek
filed a petition for interlocutory appeal with the Supreme Court of Utah
(the "court"). On appeal, the court addressed whether a water user
could acquire a right by adverse use if the seven-year period required to
maintain an adverse use began before the 1939 amendment, but did
not vest until after the amendment.
The court reviewed the district court's decision, but afforded no
deference to the district court's legal conclusion in interpreting the
statute. The court acknowledged that non-binding dicta in previous
cases conflicted with and caused confusion about whether an adverse
use claim could ripen into a water right after the effective date of the
1939 amendment. Therefore, the court looked to the plain language in
the statute. Finding that the statute was clear on its face, the court
relied solely on the statutory language in reaching its conclusion. The
statute states that "no right to the use of water either appropriated or
unappropriated can be acquired by adverse use or adverse possession."
The court reasoned that because the statute did not allow for adverse
use rights to be acquired after 1939, and because an adverse use right
vests only after seven years of adverse use, a party must complete the
seven years before 1939. The court focused on the legislature's use of
the word "acquired" as opposed to "initiated" or "begun," which
evidenced a legislative intent to prohibit the vesting of any water right
by adverse use after 1939. Based upon this reasoning, the court found
that New Escalante's adverse use claim failed because it did not
complete seven years of adverse use by 1939. The court held that an
adverse user must have completed seven years of adverse use before the
effective date of the .1939 amendment in order to satisfy an adverse use
claim.
Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's determination
and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its
ruling.
Mary Kate Finnigan

